How Intel Lost $10 Billion – and the Mobile Market

This website could gain affiliate commissions from the back links on this site. Terms of use.

Update (6/1/2020): We have republished the story below as a dialogue of how Intel’s mobile attempts consumed so significantly of the company’s attention, but eventually arrived to naught. In the yrs considering the fact that this story was released in 2016, Intel tried to build a competitive 5G modem that would place it on the slicing edge of the new industry. Sad to say, that energy eventually unsuccessful and Intel bought its 5G modem small business to Apple. Atom has ongoing to acquire as a small electrical power mobile solution for entry-amount Windows programs and Chromebooks.

The observations on foundry products are additional salient now than they were being in 2016. Again then, Intel’s 10nm was only a minimal late and the company was however considered to be on the slicing edge of semiconductor tech. TSMC at this time occupies that position, however Intel wants to reclaim its crown by 5nm. Again in 2016, we from time to time read analysts opine that Intel should really provide its fabs and embrace the fabless model due to the greater opposition from TSMC. Individuals whispers have only grown louder. I’m not declaring I concur with them, but it’s intriguing to see how this post frames the TSMC versus Intel battle. Again in 2016, things appeared incredibly diverse than they do currently.

The Qualcomm antitrust lawsuit disclosures paint Intel’s failure to obtain industry share in a incredibly diverse light-weight, but I have additional to say about that in Aspect 2 of this current story.

Primary Story Below:

Just above 4 yrs back, we reviewed Intel’s 1st plausible smartphone, the Xolo 900. Even though it could not match additional effective gadgets of the working day, it was a strong preliminary energy. Extra importantly, the Medfield SoC that run the Xolo 900 was meant to be a beachhead, a harbinger, a indicator of things to come.

4 yrs and billions of bucks later on, it’s now obvious that the very long-awaited ARM-versus-x86 war will not be fought in the tablet or smartphone industry. Intel has canceled all of its publicly announced 14nm smartphone SoCs and most of its 14nm tablet SoCs that would have delivered in Android gadgets. The company is diving into 5G research and hopes to direct the sector in acquiring 5G products and solutions. But its 3G and 4G modems are however crafted on the 28nm approach node at TSMC, even as rivals like Qualcomm transfer to 14nm for their personal products and solutions.

How did Intel control to expend up to $10 billion and have so minimal to clearly show for it? There’s no solitary, easy response — but there are absolutely some smoking cigarettes guns. If you want to realize what went completely wrong for Intel, we have to have to communicate about the semiconductor sector as a entire.

Of Fabs and Foundries

The semiconductor sector is dominated by 4 businesses: GlobalFoundries, Intel, Samsung, and TSMC. Three of these businesses — GlobalFoundries, Samsung, and TSMC — are recognised as pure-perform foundries or service provider foundries. Their small business model is primarily based on producing silicon for other businesses, not developing and launching products and solutions that they provide by themselves. (Samsung does build some customized silicon for alone, but the bulk of its foundry small business arrives from external shoppers).

Contrary to the service provider foundries, Intel designs and builds the two its fabrication plants and its microprocessors. Right until the previous few yrs, Intel by no means took foundry shoppers. Intel’s recent makes an attempt to split into the service provider foundry small business by attracting a handful of substantial-margin shoppers weren’t all that effective and have but to make substantial earnings for the company.

The distinction between service provider foundries and IDMs (integrated device manufacturers) like Intel is a significant component of why Intel’s mobile attempts played out the way they did.

Intel’s producing tactic traditionally relied on quickly adopting new approach know-how. The bulk of the company’s earnings is derived from foremost-edge nodes older amenities were being possibly upgraded or shut down as they became out of date. The chart below shows Intel’s R&D costs as a share of overall profits as compared to Samsung and TSMC:

R&D spending between semiconductor companies

TSMC pursues a incredibly diverse optimization tactic. Even though it also invests in foremost-edge semiconductor know-how, the bulk of TSMC’s earnings is attained on older know-how nodes. The chart below is primarily based on TSMC’s Q1 2015 effects:


TSMC’s earnings by approach node

As of Q1 2015, 39 % of TSMC’s earnings was attained on know-how nodes it deployed 10-20 yrs back. 54 % of its earnings arrived from nodes that were being in volume output at minimum 8 yrs back. Intel made minimal use of older amenities to build its chipsets, but its small business model is fundamentally diverse.

For most of 30 yrs, that variance did not seriously matter. From the 1980s by means of 2010, Intel beat its small-volume RISC rivals and seized the details heart by leveraging the economies of scale it created in the client Pc industry. It crushed its only serious competitor in the x86 industry and pressured AMD to provide its personal fabs in an energy to survive.


Intel drove volume in new markets by exploiting economies of scale it experienced created somewhere else

The pure-perform foundries and Intel worked in parallel tracks, typically contending with some of the very same issues, but prioritizing and solving them in diverse strategies. Intel crafted its foundries to arduous standards using a philosophy it known as “Copy Precisely.” It prioritized substantial yields, focused almost exclusively on microprocessors, and enforced stringent structure guidelines. Intel products and solutions were being made to be crafted at Intel foundries with Intel instruments and Intel’s founded greatest methods.

In contrast, TSMC and the other service provider foundries made their approach nodes to fulfill the desires of many diverse clientele. Their fabs prioritize throughput and flexibility although minimizing value. Equally products worked fantastically for their respective businesses — until eventually their businesses started out to collide.

The Restrictions of Technologies

Intel’s failure to obtain traction in the mobile industry highlights the flaws in dealing with technological development as a roadmap for corporate achievement. Regardless of recent delays and its personal decision to abandon its tick-tock model, Intel however owns the most technologically sophisticated foundries in the globe. It’s the only company to have deployed a true 14nm die shrink and it’ll be the 1st company to deploy a true 10nm node as opposed to a 10/14 or 10/16 hybrid. All of this is true — as is the simple fact that Intel put in $10 billion (in accordance to Re/code) in mobile with nothing at all to clearly show for it.

Technologies internet sites, such as ExtremeTech, have typically discussed x86 versus ARM or AMD versus Nvidia strictly in terms of approach node and roadmap. This is effective really well when talking about developments in battery daily life or overall performance, but significantly less well when used to organizations who suddenly find by themselves in immediate opposition for the 1st time in many years.

In Aspect 2 of this two-component series, we go over how Intel’s small business model and improvement priorities slowed and sabotaged its ability to contend successfully in the mobile globe. We also go over why the myriad ARM-versus-Atom debates unsuccessful to capture the true issues plaguing Chipzilla, and why the company saw these minimal adoption of its products and solutions.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *